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THE BANKRUPT'S MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY HIS
DISCHARGED DEBTS: A CONFLICT BETWEEN
CONTRACT THEORY AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY*
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFFt
Section 87 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
An express promise to pay all or part of an indebtedness
of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings begun before the promise is made, is binding.'
In his treatise on backruptcy, Professor Daniel Cowans discusses
the problem that this reaffirmation rule poses for the unwary bankrupt
and his attorney:
Few things can be more frustrating to an attorney for a
bankrupt than having to inform his client that he has given
away the protection the attorney obtained for him by the filing
of the petition. Yet it happens. Those not experienced in bank-
ruptcy work might think that, having endured the unpleasant
experiences with creditors which culminated in bankruptcy, the
bankrupts would think twice in any contact with a former
creditor. Bankrupts are not so wary. A few learn from their
experiences but a surprisingly large number . . . consent to
almost any request or demand of a creditor. If the bankrupt is to
derive the benefits sought from his bankruptcy, he must be care-
fully warned in advance against either voluntarily or inad-
vertently giving away the advantage of his position.
[T]he point attempted to be made here is that such repayment
should be left within the control of the bankrupt. Control is lost
if the bankrupt's acts put collection procedures within the power
of many creditors.
[R]epayment of discharged debts is a salutary thing but
the fact is that few bankrupts ever earn enough after bankruptcy
to handle both present living expenses and payments on past
* My colleagues, Patrick Baude and Alan Schwartz, criticized an early draft of
this article. I am grateful for their suggestions, as well as for the help of David Rose,
J.D., Indiana University, 1971, who served as my research assistant. Finally, another
faculty colleague, Morris Arnold, read this article shortly before publication and
corrected some references to the British courts as they existed in the nineteenth century.
I Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
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debts. An attempt to do so will usually result in inadequate
funds for either effort. Occasionally, the bankrupt will have
some funds with which to make some payment. He should not be
counseled against making a payment but against putting himself
into a situation in which a creditor can levy on his wages even
when he cannot pay.'
Other writers have joined Professor Cowans in pointing out the
dangers of gratuitous reaffirmations.! This practice certainly injures
bankrupts, although the magnitude of the injury is unclear. In a recent
study, Herbert Jacob asked a number of bankrupts whether their standard
of living had improved after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.
Only eight per cent responded affirmatively while 54 per cent felt that
their standard of living had actually been impaired. More than half the
bankrupts reported reaffirmations and attributed lower post-bankruptcy
living standards, at least in part, to this practice.' These figures suggest
that the damage caused by reaffirmations is indeed substantial. It becomes
difficult, therefore, to understand how a gratuitous assumption of obliga-
tion could ever benefit a bankrupt. Some debts, of course, have to be
reaffirmed. For example, if the bankrupt wants his car, he must come
to terms with the creditor holding a security interest in it.' The bankrupt
who wishes to buy food on credit will have to satisfy his grocer's pre-
bankruptcy claim. These commitments to old creditors are binding be-
cause the debtor receives new value for his promise. The rule announced
in the quoted section of the Restatement is needed to make a commitment
binding only when the bankrupt has received no value through reaffir-
mation; that is, when the transaction runs entirely in favor of the
creditor. Nothing in the rule benefits the bankrupt.
Despite the extreme one-sideness of the moral obligation theory,
no commentator has ever seriously suggested that it should be either
changed by legislative action or invalidated by judicial decision. Gerrard
Glenn had some doubts about the rule,' but most writers have accepted
2. D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW ANM PRACTICE § 893 (1963).
3. H. JAcoB, DEBTORS IN COURT 106-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as JAcoB];
Countryman, Legal Relief: Straight Bankruptcy and Wage Earner Plans, 26 Bus.
LAw. 933, 937 (1971); Comment, inadequacy of Bankruptcy Relief for Wage Earners,
1970 Wis. L. REv. 148, 152.
4. JACoB, supra note 3, at 106-12.
5. Even this type of reaffirmation may be damaging. If the value of the automobile
has declined since purchase by more than the amount by which the principal balance of
the loan has been reduced, the bankrupt should not reaffirm. Instead he should purchase
another car of equivalent quality and realize the savings.
6. G. GLENN, THE LAw GOvERNING LIQUIDATION § 342 (1935) [hereinafter cited
as GLENN]. See also F. NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmEaRIcA 192-98 (1919).
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it without question.' The editors of Collier, for instance, who have, on
occasion, taken a skeptical view of state law, apparently concede the power
of states to adopt whatever rule of contract they deem most appropriate.
The general rule is that a discharge affects only the remedy
of the creditor and the obligation itself is not cancelled.
* The law in the various states governs this matter,
and it is generally agreed that the bar of a discharge may be
waived by the making of a new promise. In reaching this
decision, the courts have employed various theories; some courts
have found consideration for the new promise in the form of a
past legal obligation plus a present moral obligation, while other
courts have declared that no new consideration is necessary to
support the waiver.'
Since the turn of the century, however, numerous state laws have
been challenged in the courts, although not always with success, on the
theory of pre-emption.' Perhaps the most celebrated example of a suc-
7. There is no provision in the Bankruptcy Act for the revival of debts
released by discharge, and whether they are revived depends entirely upon local
law. Actually, the subject is a branch of the law of contracts rather than of
the law of bankruptcy. While the Bankruptcy Act does not state that
discharged debts can be revived, it does not state or imply that they cannot;
so, assuming that the original debt is, or can be, a sufficient consideration for
a new promise, the primary question is whether a new promise was, in fact,
made.
8 H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
3288 (6th ed. J. Henderson 1955) [hereinafter cited as REMINGTON] (footnote omitted).
After discharge in bankruptcy, the bankrupt, upon making a new promise to
pay a discharged debt, will be bound, without new consideration. While it
would be within the power of Congress to enact provisions in the Federal
Bankruptcy Act governing the matter, there is no such provision and each
state is at liberty to apply its own rule.
1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 158 (3d ed. W. Jaeger
1957).
From the date of Lord Mansfield it has been settled that notwithstanding
a discharge, the original obligation to pay a discharged debt furnishes a
"moral consideration" sufficient to make enforceable a new promise to pay the
debt.
J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 111 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as MACLAcHLAN].
8. IA W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 17.33 (14th ed. J. Moore & L.
King 1971) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. Cf. 4A id. 70.62A[9]
(14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1969) (discussion of U.C.C. § 9-301(3)).
9. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Kesler v. Department of
Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261
(1929); Miller v. Anckaitis, BANKR. L. REP. 63,834 (3d Cir. 1970); In re Halo
Metal Products, Inc., 419 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1969), af'rd sub nora. United States v.
Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971); In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied sub nom. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Allen, 363 U.S. 811 (1960);
In re Wisconsin Builders Supply Co., 239 F2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
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cessful attack-is Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,"0 where the Supreme Court of
the United States held that Illinois law on the effect of wage assignments
was in conflict with the discharge feature of the Bankruptcy Act. It is
somewhat surprising that Local Loan Co. has not been invoked in a
challenge to the reaffirmation rule. Although the doctrine has never been
subject to serious attack" and has persisted for 150 years in this country,
it is not too late to question the soundness of the moral obligation theory.
We may look at its origin, try to understand how the rule came to be so
widely accepted in this country and ask whether the rule makes sense in
the light of contemporary discharge policy.
ORIGINS OF THE REAFFIRMATION THEORY
Whatever one's view about the merits of the reaffirmation rule,
the story of its birth and death in England, followed by its reincarnation
in the United States, is an interesting one. The story is one of hesitant
movement toward a principle which, when adopted in England, soon
became unpopular and was eventually repudiated. The treatise writers
and historians tell us the story is one of contract, not one of the dis-
tribution of insolvents' estates. 2  This contractual characterization
evidences a viewpoint accounting, at least in part, for the passive accept-
ance of state law typified by the excerpt from Collier.
Lord Mansfield is credited with authorship of the reaffirmation
doctrine in 1777,"s but the story of its development begins some eighty
years earlier at the close of the seventeenth century. Two decisions of the
King's Bench, one in 1697's and the other in 1699," established that a
defendant would be liable in assumpsit, both for a promise to pay a debt
contracted during infancy and for a promise to pay a debt barred by the
statute of limitations. These two types of promises, along with the pro-
mise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, were eventually to be
U.S. 985 (1957) ; City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942) ; First
National Bank v. Robinson, 107 F2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939); In re Swift, 96 F. Supp.
44 (W.D. Va. 1950) ; In re Mills, 76 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Va. 1948).
10. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
11. Cf. Leiblein v. George, 193 Mich. 462, 160 N.W. 538 (1916); Ray Bills Fin.
Corp. v. Mead, BAxNK. L. REP. f[ 63,366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (summary of opinion).
Both these cases refuse to enforce reaffirmations; but they do not consider the issue of
federal-state conflict discussed in this article.
12. Holdsworth, for instance, treats the rule in a section devoted to contract law.
No mention of it appears in his discussion of bankruptcy law. 8 W. HoLDSWORTHr, A
HISTORY OF ENIUSiH LAW 26-29, 240-45 (1926) ; 12 id. 541-42 (1938) ; see RPEmiNGTON,
supra note 7.
13. IA A. CoRBni, CoRniN oN CONTRACrS § 211 n.2 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as CoRBIN] (citing Trueman v. Fenton) ; MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 7, at 98.
14. Ball v. Hesketh, 90 Eng. Rep. 541 (K.B. 1697).
15. Hyleing v. Hastings, 91 Eng. Rep. 1157 (K.B. 1699).
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grouped together under the theory of moral obligation. Imposition of
liability in the discharge situation was not, however, to follow immediate-
ly upon the first two cases since the reaffirmation rule had a long period of
gestation.
The first judicial discussion of the bankrupt's moral obligation to
satisfy discharged obligations is found in Lewis v. Chase, a 1720
decision."8 There the bankrupt had persuaded a creditor to withdraw his
objection to the granting of the bankrupt's certificate, and, in return, the
creditor received a bond for the entire amount of the debt. Later, the
debtor sought a bill to restrain enforcement of the bond. Lord Chancellor
Parker was most unsympathetic to the petition. His opinion dismissing
the bill places considerable emphasis on the bankrupt's moral duty to pay
the discharged obligation.
Here is an honest creditor, and the bankrupt if he pay
him all, still pays but what in conscience he ought. He that
comes into equity to avoid the payment of a just debt, ought to
come with a very clear case if he hopes to succeed ...
Suppose the present bill were to be dismist, the conse-
quence would only be that the plaintiff must pay what he justly
owes; but were he to be relieved, the defendant would thereby
be put into a worse condition than any of the other creditors;
for the bankrupt's estate being distributed, he cannot now have
his proportion thereof, so that he must lose his whole debt;
and it is the plaintiff's fault to come so late: which makes the
case still the stronger against him; nor does the law make any
distinction whether the bankrupt became so by his own extra-
vagant way of living or by misfortunes; and therefore he is the
less to be favoured. It is hard enough to bar creditors of the full
remedy which the law gives for the recovery of debts. .
And it would not be fair to put the defendant, who has the law
on his side, in a worse condition than any of the other creditors
whose debts are extinguished by the statute .... 17
In the Lord Chancellor's opinion there is no reliance on the infancy and
statute of limitation cases. The turn of the century decisions are not
cited. While there is some language which might be construed as uphold-
ing the validity of a gratuitous reaffirmation, the fact that the creditor
had substantially changed his position in reliance on the bankrupt's
16. 24 Eng. Rep. 542 (Ch. 1720).
17. Id. at 543.
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promise makes the case no more than a traditional withholding of
equitable relief from a petitioner with a non-meritorious claim.
More than twenty years were to pass before the report of another
case in which the consequence of a reaffirmation was a major issue. Then
in 1742 the King's Bench held that a bankrupt could be discharged upon
common bail when a creditor sought to enforce a reaffirmation."8 All
this meant was that the reaffirming bankrupt was not required to post
property to secure his freedom pending a judgment on the merits. The
validity of the reaffirmation was not at issue. Nevertheless, the case is
evidence that even at this early date creditors were seeking to enforce
reaffirmations. There is no way of telling, however, how widespread was
the practice of seeking such reaffirmations.
By 1759 a creditor's attorney had perceived that the infancy and
statute of limitation cases might provide support for an argument that a
bankrupt's reaffirmations were enforceable. In Bailey v. Dillon9 the
creditor sought to hold a bankrupt responsible for a subsequent promise
"to pay [the discharged obligation] to the plaintiff when he should be
able." At issue was the proper form of bail. To support his request for
special bail, the creditor argued that the action was on the new obligation,
invoking an analogy to the infancy and limitation cases. Noting that it
would be improper to "enter into the general and principal question" upon
the motion before it, the court declined to reach the creditor's argument
and ruled that the bankrupt should be discharged upon common bail."
In Bailey the conscientiousness of the bankrupt had worked in his
favor; this was not so twenty years later when Lord Mansfield offered
his opinion in Trueman v. Fenton," a case which provides a series of
sharp contrasts with Bailey. Again a bankrupt was sued on his reaffirma--
tion. This time, 'however, the court directly faced the question of whether
the promise should be enforced. On the eve of his bankruptcy a debtor had
purchased linen on credit and had given his vendor two notes in payment
of the purchase price. After the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced,
18. Turner v. Schomberg, 93 Eng. Rep. 1152 (K.B. 1745). Common bail was a
fictitious device invented by King's Bench during the seventeenth century to obtain
concurrent jurisdiction with Common Pleas over a variety of personal actions. Special
bail, on the other hand, involved no fictions. The defendant was obligated to provide
real and substantial guarantees of his appearance in court.
19. 97 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1759).
20. This was the first case in which Lord Mansfield had a chance to consider the
wisdom of binding bankrupts to their reaffirmations. Along with the rest of the court,
he declined, preferring to retain the inquiry for a case in which the validity of such a
promise was a central issue. The next time this matter was to come before him he
would not hestitate to confront the issue. Indeed, he would seek an opportunity to
speak out on the matter.
21. 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 (Y-B. 1777).
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the parties agreed that the bankrupt would give the plaintiff a new note
for approximately half of the purchase price of the linen in exchange for
the two old notes. It appears that the new notes were enforceable without
reference to a theory of moral obligation because a consequence of the
exchange was that the plaintiff did not prove a claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding and therefore did not receive any dividend. Lord Mansfield
did note the creditor's non-participation in the proceeding as part of the
bargain:
That brings it to the general question, whether a bankrupt
after a commission of bankruptcy sued out, may not, in con-
sideration of a debt due before the bankruptcy, and for which
the creditor agrees to accept no dividend or benefit under the
commission, make such creditor a satisfaction in part or for the
whole of his debt, by a new undertaking and agreement?22
Nevertheless, Lord Mansfield avoided a traditional resolution of the
controversy and proceeded to assimilate the reaffirmation of the bank-
rupt's discharged debt to the other two well-established types of moral
obligation.2"
22. Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).
23. Even after almost two hundred years Mansfield's haste to announce the
moral obligation theory seems extraordinary. Not only did very traditional grounds
exist for deciding the case, but there was a procedural problem in the litigation. Recall
the court's unwillingness to give a decision on the merits in Bailey, and compare Lord
Mansfield's comments on the procedural issue.
The plea put in, in this case, is, that the debt was due at the time of the
act of bankruptcy committed; and on that plea, in point of form, there was a
strong objection made at the trial, that the allegation was not strictly true:
because at the time of the sale, credit was given to a future day; which day,
as it appeared in evidence, was subsequent to the act of bankruptcy committed.
To be sure, on the form of the plea, the defendant must fail. But I ne'ver like
to entangle justice in natters of form, and to turn parties around upon frivolous
objections where I can avoid it. It only tends for the ruin and destruction of
both. I put it therefore to the counsel on the part of the plaintiff to give
up the objection in point of form, and to take the opinion of the Court, whether
according to the facts and truths of the case, the defendant could have pleaded
his certificate in bar of the debt in question: and in case they had refused
to do so, I should have left it to the jury upon the merits. The counsel for
the plaintiff very properly gave up the point of form.
Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).
There is, of course, a good explanation for Mansfield's determination to avoid
what he felt were procedural niceties and to place the decision on the broadest possible
grounds. Between the cautious decision in Bailey and the broad holding in Trueman
stands his opinion in Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765), where he
argued that consideration had only evidentiary value. This approach was too radical
for his time, and was soon discredited by the House of Lords [Rann v. Hughes, 2 Eng.
Rep. 18 (H.L. 1778)], but Lord Mansfield's effort to reform the doctrine of con-
sideration was not limited to one approach:
Lord Mansfield, when in 1756 he became Chief Justice, set himself to
prune the 'Gothick' superfluities which marred the symmetry of the common
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Truemxn stands as the high water mark of the reaffirmation rule
in England. During the next thirty years no new developments occurred,
but beginning in 1805 some of the reported cases hint at dissatisfaction
with the doctrine. The bankrupt was given some protection through
judicial scrutiny of evidence offered to support the allegation of a
promise,"' and the courts allowed conditions to be attached to the
promise." In 1812 the Common Pleas was willing to draw a sharp
distinction between the promise of a bankrupt and one of a debtor who
agreed to honor an obligation where enforcement was barred by the
statute of limitations. Evidence that would be sufficient in the latter case
would not necessarily satisfy the standard applicable to a bankrupt's
promise. This decision, Mucklow v. St. George,26 seems to indicate a
sharp break with the Mansfield tradition of unquestioned enforceability.
The final relevant litigation occurred in 1823.27 Even though the
creditor prevailed, the unsuccessful argument of the bankrupt's counsel
is worth noting. For the first time Lord Mansfield was directly challenged.
law. He would liberalize the whole conception of contract and, in particular,
would moderate the undue influence of consideration. The temper of the age,
rational and cosmopolitan, was propitious. Nor had the doctrine itself, though
now two hundred years old, been defined so firmly as to preclude a fresh
examination ....
C. Fi oor, HiSoRY AND SOURCES OF THE Co MoN LAW 406 (1949).
In this favourable environment Lord Mansfield led two assaults upon
the doctrine. In his first and bolder attempt he sought to destroy the status
of consideration as an essential and independent element in the action of
Assumpsit and to reduce it to the level of evidence.
Id. at 408.
In his second line of attack Lord Mansfield was less ambitious. Assuming
the necessity for consideration, he took advantage of the reluctance of his
predecessors to explain its meaning in authoritative language and offered
a new and revised version. The pressure of moral sentiment, already faintly
felt, and the avowed, if exceptional, instances of past consideration seemed
to invite the construction of a broad and accommodating principle . . . This
decision [Trueman v. Fenton], while it must be set against, could still be
recognized with the judgment in Rann v. Hughes delivered in the following
year. The rebuff which Lord Mansfield there received enhanced rather
than diminished the charm of his alternative approach to the problem. The
debtor who acknowledged a statute-barred debt, the adult who recognized a
youthful liability, the discharged bankrupt who found himself in unexpected
if precarious affluence--all these were bound in honour, and law should add
its more prosaic sanction. The House of Lords had not defined the doctrine
upon the pre-eminence of which they insisted, and, by supplying the omission
on his own terms, Lord Mansfield would kiss the rod and yet avoid humilia-
tion ....
Id. at 409-10. See also Holdsworth, The Modern History of the Doctrine of Considera-
tion, 2 B.U.L. Ray. 174, 186-97 (1922).
24. Lynbuy v. Weightman, 170 Eng. Rep. 784 (K.B., nisi prius 1805).
25. Fleming v. Hayne, 171 Eng. Rep. 500 (KB., nisi prius 1816); see also Penn
v. Bennet, 171 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B., nisi prius 1815) (jury verdict for creditor).
26. 128 Eng. Rep. 471 (C.P. 1812).
27. Brix v. Braham, 130 Eng. Rep. 114 (C.P. 1823).
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It was argued that Trueman was not controlling because the bankrupt in
that case had in fact received new consideration. The Common Pleas
rejected the argument and applied Lord Mansfield's doctrine to a clearly
gratuitous reaffirmation.
Further attempts to undercut the precedential value of Trueman
were subsequently rendered unnecessary by three acts of Parliament, the
first enacted in 1824, followed by similar legislation in 1825 and 1842:
And be it enacted, That no Bankrupt after his Certificate
of Conformity shall have been allowed under any Commission
of Bankrupt already issued, or hereafter to be issued, shall be
liable to pay or satisfy any Debt, Claim or Demand from which
he shall have been discharged by virtue of such Certificate, or
any Part of such Debt, Claim or Demand, upon any Contract,
Promise, or Agreement made or to be made after the suing out
of the Commission, unless such Promise, Contract or Agree-
ment be made in Writing, signed by the Bankrupt, or by some
Person thereto lawfully authorized, in Writing, by such Bank-
rupt.
28
There is no need to speculate on the reasons behind this legislation.
The disenchantment with Lord Mansfield's reaffirmation doctrine is well
documented in a book on bankruptcy legislation published in London in
1827. With a few changes in style it would be possible to imagine that
the author was writing about the 1971 American scene:
Under the old laws there were some very hard cases as
regarded liability of the bankrupt upon new promises after
certificate obtained. It had become the frequent practice to
entrap the bankrupt into these acknowledgments, or conditional
promises, as compelled the Courts to hold them liable for
their old debts. In order to remedy this mischief, it is now most
usefully enacted by the 131st section of the new Bankrupt Act
[that a written promise is required] .... "
There was no significant litigation under the 1824 statute and in
1849 Parliament went even further and made all reaffirmations, written
and oral, unenforceable.2 0 From this time on the reaffirmation doctrine
was completely dead in England."'
28. 5 Geo. 4, c. 98, § 128 (1824) ; accord, 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, § 131 (1825); 5 & 6
Vict., c. 122, § 43 (1842).
29. F. HOLT, THE BANKRUPT LAWS AS ESTABLISHED BY THE NEW ACT 511
(1827).
30. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 106, § 204 (1849) ; accord, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 134, § 164 (1861).
31. The 1849 statute was repealed in 1869 during the course of a general revision
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ACCEPTANCE OF THE REAFFIRMATION THEORY IN AMERICA
Thomas Jefferson once suggested a restriction on the use of British
case authority in American litigation. Writing to Federal Judge John
Tyler of Virginia in June of 1812 he referred to this matter.
. . . On our arrival here, the question would at once arise,
by what law will we govern ourselves? The resolution seems to
have been, by that system with which we are familiar, to be
altered by ourselves occasionally, and adapted to our new
situation . . . . But the state of the English law, at the date of
our emigration, constituted the system adopted here. We may
doubt, therefore, the propriety of quoting in our courts English
authorities subsequent to that adoption, still more the admission
of authorities posterior to the Declaration of Independence, or
rather to the accession of that king whose reign ab initio was
that very tissue of wrongs which rendered the Declaration at
length necessary.
The reason for it had inception at least as far back as the
commencement of his reign. This relation to the beginning of
his reign would add the advantage of getting us rid of all Mans-
field's innovations, or civilizations of the common law. For,
however I admit the superiority of the civil over the common
law Code, as a system of perfect justice, yet an incorporation of
the two would be like Nebuchadnezzar's image of metals and
clay,-a thing without cohesion of parts.... "
of the bankruptcy laws. Subsequently, a creditor argued that the repeal had reinstated
the law of Lord Mansfield's time. His argument was not sympathetically received:
The argument is, that because the Act is silent on this matter, therefore the
debtor is remitted to the position in which he stood before 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, and
the whole policy of the bankruptcy law since that Act has been absolutely re-
versed. That would be a startling conclusion ....
The present Act in its general scope was obviously intended to make
bankruptcy proceedings more completely effect the object of winding up a
man's previous liabilities and giving him an altogether fresh start. I am not
prepared to hold that, as it were by a side wind, and by reason of the omission
of particular provisions with regard to the effect of such promises as these,
the Act has reversed the whole course of legislative policy on this subject
since 6 Geo. 4, c. 16. It therefore appears to me, both on the reason of the
thing and such authority as there is, the reply is bad and our judgment must
be for the defendant.
Heather & Son v. Webb, 2 C.P.D. 1, 6-7 (1876).
However, the promise is enforceable today if there is new consideration. Jakeman
v. Cook, 4 Ex. D. 26 (1878).
32. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler, June 17, 1812, quoted in 1
R. TYLER, THE LETTnS AND TImEs op THE TYLE s 265 (1884).
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If Jefferson's view had prevailed, the development of the reaffirma-
tion doctrine in this country, relying as it did on English precedent,
would have been severely hampered. However, the history of that doctrine
here is a tribute to Lord Mansfield. Trueman and its progeny dominate
the scene. The first reported attempt to enforce a bankrupt's reaffirma-
tion is Scouton v. Eislord,3' an 1810 New York decision. Short and
typical of nineteenth century opinions on the topic, the complete text
stated:
Per Curiam. The debt of an insolvent or bankrupt is due
in conscience, notwithstanding his discharge. He may, there-
fore, revive the old debt by a new promise, and the old debt
will be a sufficient consideration. This was so declared in the
case of Trueman v. Fenton (Cowp., 544). But the question here
is, whether this was anything more than a conditional promise,
and whether it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to have
shown that the defendant was of sufficient ability to pay without
distressing his family. It has been repeatedly held, and seems
now to be a settled principle (2 H. BI., 126., Besford v.
Saunders; 3 Esp. N. P. Rep., and 159 Cole v. Saxby; 4 Esp. N.
P. Rep., and 36, Davies v. Smith), that a promise to pay when
able, a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or by a certifi-
cate under the bankrupt law, was not an absolute but a condi-
tional promise, and it lay with the plaintiff to prove the defen-
dant able. This appears, in the case before us, to have been a
condititional promise; and taken together and in connection
what the defendant was proved to have said before the suit was
brought, or what he is stated to have said upon the trial, he
promised to pay the debt, provided only he could do it without
distress. The justice ought, then, to have required proof of his
ability to pay; it would be equally illegal and unjust to compel
the defendant to pay without such proof.
There being no cause of action shown as to the promise
upon the note, the judgment below ought to be reversed.
Judgment reversed.34
Notice the court's perfunctory acceptance of the reaffirmation
rule. 5 Since British authorities appeared to embrace the moral obligation
33. 4 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 241, 7 Johns. 36 (1810).
34. Id.
35. Another good example of the importance attached to English authorities
is the opinion in Corliss v. Sheperd, 28 Me. 550 (1848).
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theory without reservation, American lawyers of this era did not directly
challenge the rule. Instead they argued that the rule was not applicable
to their clients' promises. They challenged the sufficiency of the plead-
ings,8 sought to establish that the promise was a conditional one,"7
argued the bar of estoppel" or asserted that the plaintiff was not the
proper party to enforce the promise. 9 This .uncritical acceptance of
Lord Mansfield's dogma created an ironic situation. At the very moment
that the reaffirmation rule was dying in England it was being born in
the United States. Decisions that were soon to be of only historical
interest in England were cited without hesitation here and provided the
foundation for the rule in effect today.
Developments in England during the second quarter of the nine-
teenth century could have provided the materials for a good argument
against importation of Lord Mansfield's rule. The parliamentary actions
of 1824, 1825 and 1842, requiring reaffirmations to be evidenced by a
writing, and the complete abolition of the doctrine in 1849, if noted,
might have convinced a court that the rule was not a wise one. However,
only one American attorney invoked an argument based on the parlia-
mentary action, and he was content to argue that the courts of Vermont
should require written evidence of the reaffirmation."
A number of factors contributed to the successful transfer of the
dying doctrine to this country. Initially, from a present-day viewpoint
it is easy to review the English cases and see that the demise of the
reaffirmation rule began as early as 1805. Such a development could not
have been readily recognized by American lawyers and judges of that
period. It took time for changes in British law to be communicated to
the American bar. Many lawyers did not have access to treatises and it
36. Maxim v. Morse, 8 Mass. 127 (1811); Wait v. Morris, 10 N.Y. Com. L.
Rep. 1135, 6 Wend. 394 (1831); Shippey v. Henderson, 5 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 823, 14
Johns. 178 (1817).
37. Fitzgerald v. Alexander & Mullen, 13 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 651, 19 Wend. 402
(1838) ; Scouton v. Eislord, 4 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 241, 7 Johns. 36 (1810).
38. M'Nair v. Gilbert, 10 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 389, 3 Wend. 344 (1829).
39. Depuy v. Swart, 10 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 313, 3 Wend. 135 (1829). Other early
decisions accepted the moral obligation theory without question. See, e.g., Porter v.
Porter, 31 Me. 169 (1850) ; White v. Cushing, 30 Me. 267 (1849) ; Corliss v. Shepherd,
28 Me. 550 (1848) ; Stilwell v. Coope, 17 N.Y. Co. L. Rep. 555, 4 Denio 225 (1847) ;
Fitzgerald v. Alexander & Mullen, 13 N.Y. Com. L. Rep. 651, 19 Wend. 402 (1838);
Tooker v. Doane, 2 Hall 532 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829); Walbridge v. Harroon, 18 Vt.
448 (1846).
40. Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Flint, 17 Vt. 508 (1845). The 1849 statutory
change is cryptically noted in a Massachusetts decision but is not invoked in opposition
to the reaffirmation rule. Lerow v. Wilmarth, 89 Mass. 463, 466 (1863).
See also Craig v. Seitz, 63 Mich. 727, 30 N.W. 347 (1886), in which the court
refused to require a written reaffirmation when there was no statutory requirement
to that effect.
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is far from clear that the available treatises accurately portrayed what was
happening.4 Furthermore, the changes in English law, even if immediate-
ly perceived and completely understood, probably came too late to affect
developments in the United States. The most significant fact was the
abolition of the doctrine by Parliament in 1849, and by that time the rule
had secured a strong foothold in this country.
Temporal factors alone, however, do not explain the unquestioned
acceptance of Lord Mansfield's view in the United States. Implicit in this
review of developments in England and the United States is the position
that Lord Mansfield and others ought not to have been eager to embrace
a moral obligation theory. This may be unfair. The reaffirmation rule
made some sense as a contract doctrine. During the last century and one-
half there has been a trend toward enforcement of an ever-widening
range of promissory obligations. In such a milieu the doctrine has ap-
peared to be sound. 2 It is chiefly from the contemporary bankruptcy per-
spective that the doctrine appears questionable. If a society wants to free a
debtor from his past obligations and protect the reckless spender from the
consequences of his improvidence, then it does not make sense to facilitate
the assumption of old burdens. But Lord Mansfield and those early
American judges who followed his lead did not live in a society which
placed much emphasis on the discharge feature of bankruptcy legislation.
The first English discharge feature had found its way into the bank-
ruptcy law in 1705,"8 about seventy years prior to Trueman, and it was
a most limited one available only to merchants. The non-commercial
bankrupt in England did not become eligible for voluntary bankruptcy
until 1861." Not until the ordinary debtor could himself seek relief can
it be said that English law placed any substantial emphasis on rehabilita-
tion."
A similar change in attitude toward debtor discharge can be seen in
the United States during the nineteenth century.4" There were three
41. The third edition of Parsons on Contracts, published in 1857, notes the
parliamentary action of 1825 but does not report the complete abolition of the reaffir-
mation rule by statute in 1849. 1 T. PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 308 n. g (3d
ed. 1857). If this is typical of the treatises which were consulted by American
attorneys, it is clear that they did not have the information which would have permitted
an intelligent challenge to Lord Mansfield's doctrine.
42. H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 53-54 (1961).
43. 4 Anne, c. 17, § 7 (1705).
44. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 134, § 69 (1861).
45. This argument will not appeal to those who do not believe that merchants
and non-merchants have equally meritorious claims to the benefits of discharge legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Note, Discharge Provisions in Consumner Bankruptcy: The Need for
a New Approach, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1251, 1259-66 (1970).
46. See 7 REMINGTON, supra note 7, § 2993.
BANKRUPT'S MORAL OBLIGATION
federal bankruptcy acts during this period, each in operation for only a
short period of time. 7 The discharge feature in each one became more
liberal than that found in the preceding statute. But during the first part
of the nineteenth century, when Lord Mansfield's doctrine was taking
root here, none of the federal statutory models was sufficiently debtor-
oriented to encourage challenge to the moral obligation theory. The state
insolvency laws, which controlled when no federal bankruptcy legislation
was in effect, were also insufficiently debtor-oriented to encourage a
challenge to the premises underlying the reaffirmation rule.4" Thus in
neither eighteenth-century England nor nineteenth-century America could
one reasonably expect the debtor-oriented frame of mind that would have
led counsel directly to oppose Lord Mansfield's view.49
Even if the conflict between the moral obligation theory and the
discharge feature of bankruptcy legislation had been appreciated during
the nineteenth century, it does not follow that a pre-emption argument
would have met with success. Displacement of the reaffirmation rule
47. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch.
6, 2 Stat. 248; Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of
June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. The statutes are briefly reviewed in 1A CoIiER,
supra note 7, 1 14.01[1]. The 1800 statute conditioned the discharge on creditor
consent. The 1841 statute evidences a major change in philosophy. Withholding of
creditor consent was tied to a finding of wrongful conduct on the part of the bankrupt.
48. State insolvency laws were concerned with two problems. Some regulated
the common law liquidation device of an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Others
were concerned with all aspects of the insolvent's affairs. Under some statutes the
debtor got a discharge; under others he did not. See S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' RmEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 349-53 (1967); GLENN,
mipra note 6, § 338. No case draws any distinction between a promise to pay a debt
discharged under a state insolvency law and one where the discharge was received under
federal law. Scouton v. Eislord (supra notes 33-34 & text accompanying) involved a
discharge received under state law.
49. During the nineteenth century only one American judge took note of the
problem of hasty reaffirmations and he believed that a strict evidentiary standard
would handle the matter.
When a man has been relieved from the payment of his debts by a legal
proceeding without ever having paid one cent of the money, if he be an honest
man, he must always feel the influence of this moral obligation, and be willing
to express his intentions to pay the debts if he should ever become able there-
after to do so; and under the influence of circumstances, is very liable thought-
lessly and without due reflection, to make loose declarations, which, if strictly
construed against him, would constitute valid and binding new promises of
payment. The law, in tenderness to his very delicate and embarrassed state
of feeling, steps in to his relief and will shield him if possible from the con-
sequences of his heedless and improvident declarations. It therefore declares
that a new promise, to be binding, must not be a mere declaration of a wish
or intention to pay the debt. [citations] But the promise must amount to a
direct, positive, certain and unqualified engagement made with the creditor
or his agent to pay the debt, showing also at the same time a willingness to
pay it, either then, or at some specified time thereafter, or when able.
Homer v. Speed, 2 P. Jr. & H. 616, 652 (Va. 1857) (dissenting opinion).
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because of bankruptcy concerns would have required a judicial persuasion
that, in the administration of insolvents' estates, federal laws should be
paramount. The sporadic and controversial character of federal bank-
ruptcy legislation during the nineteenth century was not at all likely to
encourage such an attitude. As Charles Warren notes:
The trail of [the Bankruptcy Clause] is strewn with a
host of unsuccessful objections based on constitutional grounds
against the enactment of various provisions, all of which are
now regarded as perfectly orthodox features of a bankruptcy
law. Thus, it was at first contended that, constitutionally,
such a law must be confined to the lines of the English statute;
next, that it could not discharge prior contracts; next, that
a purely voluntary law would be non-uniform and therefore
unconstitutional; next, that any voluntary bankruptcy was un-
constitutional; next, that there could be no discharge of debts
of any class except traders; next, that a bankruptcy law could
not apply to corporations; next, that allowance of State exemp-
tions of property would make a bankruptcy law non-uniform;
next, that any composition was unconstitutional; next, that
there could be no composition without an adjudication in bank-
ruptcy; next, that there could be no sale of mortgaged property
free from the mortgage. All these objections, so hotly and fre-
quently asserted from period to period, were overcome either
by public opinion or by the Court."
Until the constitutional debate had subsided (and Warren suggests
that it had ended by 1898) " a successful pre-emption argument was not
a reasonable possibility.52 By this time the reaffirmation rule had been
around for almost 100 years and uncritical acceptance of it was common-
place.
Even though the reaffirmation doctrine has been before the Supreme
Court on two occasions, it has never been fully evaluated. In the first
case Allen & Co. v. Ferguson," the Court acknowledged the existence of
the rule but did not in fact hold the bankrupt to his promise, finding
that there was insufficient evidence of the new obligation. The other
pronouncement of the Court is found in Zavelo v. Reeves," a 1913
50. C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 9-10 (1935).
51. Id. 144.
52. For an argument that state law could not be overridden by federal law, see
Lawton, Another Question Under the Bankrupt Act of 1867, 4 ALrANY LJ. 294 (1871).
53. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 1 (1874).
54. 227 U.S. 625 (1913).
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decision, commonly cited today in support of the rule. Such citation of
Zavelo, however, is arguably off the mark. Subsequent to the filing of
a petition in bankruptcy, the debtor managed to effect a composition with
his creditors which was confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Part of the
funds used to pay the creditors participating in the composition was
advanced by one of the participating creditors. This advance was made
in the interval between the filing of the petition and the confirmation of
the composition. To obtain the loan the bankrupt promised the creditor
that he would repay the principal sum plus an amount equal to what
was already owed, less any sums received by the creditor through the
composition plan. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
creditor might enforce a reaffirmation made in the interval between
adjudication and discharge. The Court held that it made no difference
whether the reaffirmation took place prior to or after the discharge as
long as it occurred after the petition. In this context, it approved the
reaffirmation doctrine.
It is settled, however, that a discharge while releasing the
bankrupt from legal liability to pay a debt that was provable in
the bankruptcy, leaves him under a moral obligation that is
sufficient to support a new promise to pay the debt. And in
reason, as well as by the greater weight of authority, the date of
the new promise is immaterial. .... 5
Zavelo is certainly correct. Because the debtor received new consideration
for his uncoerced promise, the promise should have been enforced. As
MacLachlan points out:
Once in bankruptcy, it is desirable to let the bankrupt
mobilize any remaining credit he may have based upon his
friendships, his character, and his prospective resources.
Through making an effective waiver of a discharge in relation
to specific new debts, a bankrupt may sometimes raise the
necessary funds to effectuate a composition or a similar arrange-
ment with his old creditors . . .
However, this has nothing to do with the merits or demerits of
55. Id. at 629.
56. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 7, at 98. In Schuman Bros. v. First Natl Bank,
115 Okla. 23, 240 P. 647 (1925), appeal dismissed, 274 U.S. 716 (1927), without chal-
lenging the rule, the court noted the presence of new consideration and stated that
this strengthened the case for enforceability. Cf. American Thrift and Fin. Plan, Inc.
v. Potter, 157 So. 2d 297 (La. App., 1963), where the court expressed the belief that
it would be most unlikely that a man would agree to pay an old debt to secure new
credit.
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gratuitous reaffirmations. The Supreme Court in Zavelo did not direct
the slightest attention to the bankruptcy consequences of Lord Mans-
field's doctrine. Those with a taste for the ironic will note the parallels
between Trueman and Zavelo. Both are, or were, the main cases cited in
support of the reaffirmation doctrine in their respective jurisdictions. In
each case the moral obligation theory was not essential for enforcement
of the promise, yet the eagerness of the court to invoke it established
precedent for the principle that gratuitous reaffirmations are binding.
In both cases the reaffirmation was made by a businessman seeking
commercial advantage, yet much of the litigation today involves persons
who have received nothing for their promise. In neither decision is there
any discussion of whether the rule announced is consistent with the
objectives of bankruptcy legislation. Thus, what began as part of Lord
Mansfield's effort to remake the law of consideration has, over the years
and in a most subtle fashion, become unquestioned dogma with serious
bankruptcy consequences.
There are a number of reasons why the reaffirmation rule went
unchallenged during the nineteenth century. Passive acceptance has con-
tinued into the twentieth century, and as the years pass the likelihood
of challenge diminishes. Time continues to add luster to Lord Mans-
field's moral obligation theory. It is not, however, too late to question
whether a bankrupt ought to be able to reaffirm his discharged obligations.
There is nothing in the history of the rule to suggest that such an
examination is inappropriate. If anything, consideration of its merits is
long overdue.
CASES UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Four times during the last forty years the Supreme Court has con-
sidered the question whether a state rule of law was invalid under the
supremacy clause because of conflict with the discharge provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act." The results are equally divided with two triumphs each
for the bankrupt and the creditor. However, the trend of decision, as
evidenced by an important opinion at the last term of Court, clearly favors
the bankrupt and provides support for an argument that the reaffirmation
rule is invalid.
The first of these cases, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 8 came before the
Court in 1934. A creditor sought to collect, under a pre-bankruptcy
wage assignment, wages earned by the bankrupt after the institution of
bankruptcy proceedings. Illinois law clearly favored the creditor in this
57. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
58. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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situation, and the state courts had twice held that the lien of the wage
assignment attached to such earnings. According to a unanimous court,
however, the Illinois rule could not prevail since the bankrupt, not the
creditor, was entitled to all wages earned after the initiation of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Mr. Justice Sutherland articulated a clear and strong;
federal policy:
When a person assigns future wages, he, in effect, pledges
his future earning power. The power of the individual to earn
a living for himself and those dependent upon him is in the
nature of a personal liberty quite as much as, if not more than,
it is a property right. To preserve its free exercise is of the
utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private
necessity, but because it is a matter of great public concern.
From the viewpoint of the wage earner there is little difference
between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.
Pauperism may be the necessary result of either. The amount of
the indebtedness, or the proportion of wages assigned, may here
be small, but the principle, once established, will equally apply
where both are very great. The new opportunity in life and
the clear field for future effort, which it is the purpose of the
bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor would be of
little advantage to the wage earner if he were obliged to face the
necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion of
his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment
of indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy. . . . [W] e
reject the Illinois decisons as to the effect of an assignment of
wages earned after bankruptcy as being destructive of the
purpose and spirit of the bankruptcy act."9
Local Loan Co. was cited only in dissent when, seven years later,
the Supreme Court, in Reitz v. Mealey,6° upheld the suspension of a
bankrupt's driver's license under § 94(b) of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law."' According to that statute, both an operator's license and
his vehicle registration certificate could be suspended for three years if
the holder failed to satisfy any judgment against him for damages result-
ing from a motor vehicle accident. Prior to the expiration of the three-
year period, only satisfaction of the judgment would be grounds for
restoration of the suspended privileges. A bankruptcy discharge was
59. Id. at 245.
60. 314 US. 33 (1941).
61. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAv § 332 (McKinney 1970).
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specifically excluded from the definition of satisfaction. When the bank-
rupt sought to restrain the New York Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
from suspending his driver's license, the majority saw no impermissible
conflict with § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.
• The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the
reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the
simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the
legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not
interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is
not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an en-
forcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety.2
The relationship between Local Loan Co. and Reitz was for a long
time unclear. Perhaps the opinion in Reitz evidenced a shift toward
greater deference to state law in all cases of alleged conflict with the
Bankruptcy Act. On the other hand, it is possible to perceive a sub-
stantial difference in the threat posed to the rehabilitative features of the
Bankruptcy Act by the state law in these two cases. It is dear, for
instance, that congressional policy was seriously threatened in Local
Loan Co. Illinois law stood directly in the path of debtor rehabilitation.
If the Supreme Court had held that a wage assignment was effective as
to wages earned after the bankruptcy petition it would have invited
creditors to make extensive use of wage assignments, thus jeopardizing
the future earning capacity of all bankrupts. On the other hand, the danger
posed by the provision of the New York law in Reitz was much less
substantial. The New York statute could have an adverse effect on the
future earning capacity of only one class of bankrupts. Those absolutely
dependent upon a motor vehicle for employment would suffer seriously,
and only those who could not switch to another profession would be as
seriously disadvantaged as the wage assignor. Thus, the facts in Reitz
arguably presented a much weaker case for displacement of state law
than did those in Local Loan Co.
In a 1962 case, Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,6" the Supreme
Court confirmed and extended the holding of Reitz. It refused to set
aside the so-called creditor control provisions of Utah's version of the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act" even though the
power to invoke the suspension provisions of the statute was placed
solely in the hands of a creditor holding an unsatisfied judgment arising
62. 314 U.S. at 37.
63. 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
64. UTAH CoDE ANN., ch. 41-12 (1970).
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out of a traffic accident. The creditor's option to suspend the bankrupt's
driving privilege was a powerful post-discharge collection device. Never-
theless, the statute was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, devoted
considerable time to an exposition of the history of the statute. Near the
close of his opinion he wrote:
Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting
agency under the pressure of organized creditors. Victims of
careless car drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and
uncertain composition, not even remotely united by a common
financial interest. The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act
for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors. It is not directed to bank-
rupts as such. Though in a particular case a discharged bank-
rupt who wants to have his rightfully suspended license and
registration restored may have to pay the amount of a dis-
charged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the
purposes served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially
tangential.65
The extraordinary deference to state legislative action apparent
in the Kesler opinion lasted for only nine years. In June, 1971, the
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice White, clearly and force-
fully repudiated Reitz and Kesler. At issue in Perez v. Campbell6
was the validity of the same creditor control provision which had been
upheld in Kesler. This time the provision was invalidated.
What is at issue here is the power of a State to include
as part of this comprehensive enactment designed to secure
compensation for automobile accident victims a section pro-
viding that a discharge in bankruptcy of the automobile accident
tort judgment shall have no effect on the judgment debtor's
obligation to repay the judgment creditor at least insofar as
such repayment may be enforced by the withholding of driving
privileges by the State .
The sole emphasis in the Act is one of providing leverage
for the collection of damages from drivers who either admit
that they are at fault or are adjudged negligent. . ..
65. 369 U.S. at 174.
66. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of
Kesler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation
of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its
law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.
Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken
in nearly all our Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would
enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all unwanted federal
legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report
articulating some state interest or policy-other than frustration
of the federal objective-that would be tangentially furthered
by the proposed state law. .... "
The decision in Perez should encourage a challenge to the reaffirma-
tion doctrine. Mr. Justice White cites Local Loan Co. with approval, 8
and his entire opinion evidences a strong commitment to protecting the
utility of the debtor's discharge. This commitment is demonstrated by
the Court's willingness to set aside a state law which weakened, but did
not entirely destroy, the protective effect of the discharge. The Court
clearly indicated that a good motive will not save any state law that is
in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, thus completely undercutting the
argument that since the reaffirmation rule had an innocent origin in the
law of contracts it cannot be pre-empted by federal law.6"
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LORD MANSFIELD'S THEORY
AND THE CURRENT DISCHARGE PROVISIONS
The fundamental tension between the discharge feature of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and Lord Mansfield's concept of moral obligation can be
clearly illustrated by examining the Restatement's formulation of the
doctrine of consideration. In common law countries the doctrine of
consideration helps to establish the limits of an enforceable obligation.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however, adopts a narrow view
of consideration. That term is not used to express the legal conclusion
that a promise is enforceable. Rather it is clearly associated with bargain
transactions. According to § 19(1), "[t]he formation of a contract
requires a bargain in which there is . . . consideration."7 Section 75(1)
continues: "To constitute consideration, a performance or a return
67. Id. at 643, 646-47, 651-52.
68. Id. at 648.
69. The possibility of an inquiry into motive is discussed in The Supreme Court,
1961 Term, 76 HA~v. L. REv. 54, 150-52 (1962).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS § 19(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
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promise must be bargained for."' The presence of a bargain provides
a substantive basis for the enforcement of a promise, reliance and unjust
enrichment being independent but related bases. The draftsmen of the
Restatement (Second) discuss various theories of enforceability.
Bargains are widely believed to be beneficial to the com-
munity in the provision of opportunities for freedom of indivi-
dual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which
productive energy and product are apportioned in the economy.
The enforcement of bargains rests in part on the common belief
that enforcement enhances that utility. Where one party has
performed, there are additional grounds for enforcement.
Where, for example, one party has received goods from the
other and has broken his promise to pay for them, enforcement
of the promise not only encourages the making of socially
useful bargains; it also reimburses the seller for a loss incurred
in reliance on the promise and prevents the unjust enrichment
of the buyer at the seller's expense. Each of these three grounds
of enforcement, bargain, reliance and unjust enrichment, has
independent force, but the bargain element alone satisfies the
requirement of consideration. .... "'
Whenever a creditor relies solely upon the rule of Restatement
(Second), § 87, there will have been no bargain with the creditor, no
reliance by the creditor and no unjust enrichment of the debtor except
insofar as one of these bases of enforcement is established by events
occurring prior to the effective date of the bankrupt's discharge. The
enforceability of the promise is, of course, not determined entirely by
events occurring prior to bankruptcy. There is a post-bankruptcy event
(the reaffirmation) which is an essential part of the obligation; but it is
one which normally would not be sufficient to create contractual re-
sponsibility. It is this discriminatory departure from the basic concept
of consideration that creates the conflict with federal law.
The draftsmen of the Restatement note the relationship between
consideration and legal formalities:
Consideration furnishes a substantive rather than a formal
basis for the enforcement of a promise. Many bargains, par-
ticularly when fully performed on one side, involve acts in the
course of performance which satisfy some or all of the func-
71. Id., § 75(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
72. Id., § 76, comment b.
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tions of form and thus may be thought of as natural formalities.
Four principal functions have been identified which legal for-
malities in general may serve: the evidentiary function, to pro-
vide evidence of the existence and terms of the contract; the
cautionary function, to guard the promisor against ill-considered
action; the deterrent function, to discourage transactions of
doubtful utility; and the channeling or signalizing function, to
distinguish a particular type of transaction from other types
and from tentative or exploratory expressions of intention in
the way that coinage distinguishes money from other metal.
But formality is not essential to consideration; nor does for-
mality supply consideration where the element of exchange is
absent.
As indicated by the draftsmen, the presence of a bargain transaction,
a natural formality, may provide the promisor with some of the protec-
tions commonly associated with legal formalities. Bargain transactions,
for instance, are less likely to be inconsiderate engagements than those
in which the promises are gratuitous. However, there are situations in
which other social goals are so important that a decision is made to set
aside the protections of form. This willingness to dilute the protections
available to the bankrupt promisor is made explicit by Professor Fuller:
Courts have frequently enforced promises on the simple
ground that the promisor was only promising to do what he
ought to have done anyway. These cases have either been
condemned as wanton departures from legal principle, or reluct-
antly accepted as involving the kind of compromise logic must
inevitably make at times with sentiment. I believe that these
decisions are capable of rational defense. When we say the
defendant was morally obligated to do the things he promised,
we in effect assert the existence of a substantive ground for
enforcing the promise. In a broad sense, a similar line of
reasoning justifies the special status accorded by the law to
contracts of exchange. Men ought to exchange goods and ser-
vices; therefore when they enter contracts to that end, we en-
force those contracts. On the side of form, concern for formal
guarantees justifiably diminishes where the promise is backed
by a moral obligation to do the thing promised. What does it
matter that the promisor may have acted without great deliber-
73. Id., comment c.
BANKRUPT'S MORAL OBLIGATION
ation, since he is only promising to do what he should have
done without a promise? For the same reason, can we not
justifiably overlook some degree of evidentiary insecurity?
In refutation of the notion of "moral consideration" it is
sometimes said that moral obligation plus a mere promise to
perform that obligation can no more create legal liability than
zero plus zero can have any other sum than zero. But a mathe-
matical analogy at least equally appropriate is the proposition
that one-half plus one-half equals one. The court's conviction
that the promisor ought to do the thing, plus the promisor's own
admission of his obligation, may tilt the scales in favor of
enforcement where neither standing alone would be suf-
ficient . ."
Even though Professor Fuller was not concerned with the bank-
ruptcy implications of the moral obligation theory, his formulation of its
rationale reveals its weakness. State policy favoring enforcement of the
reaffirmation is so strong that the bankrupt is to be deprived of whatever
evidentiary and cautionary safeguards the bargain concept of considera-
tion would ordinarily provide."5 This aberration of state law facilitates
the debtor's assumption of an obligation and conflicts with bankruptcy
policy in two respects. These conflicts can be illustrated by examining one
of the justifications commonly offered for the discharge feature found
in contemporary bankruptcy legislation.
It seems that discharges were first introduced in the
English Bankruptcy Acts as a means of inducing bankrupts to
make a clean disclosure and delivery of their assets, and to
comply otherwise with the Bankruptcy Laws. The later develop-
ment of the discharge represents an independent though not
unrelated public policy in favor of extricating an insolvent
debtor from what would otherwise be a financial impasse. A
business man may sometimes get new credit after a failure, if
74. Fuller, Coiaideratimo and Form, 41 CoLum. L. Rav. 799, 821-22 (1941).
75. Corbin also expresses hostility to forgiveness of obligation when he discusses
the moral obligation theory.
A few of the earlier cases held that a new promise by the debtor was
not binding, distinguishing between bankruptcy and statute of limitations
in that the former discharged the debt while the latter merely barred the
remedy. This distinction did not survive, for the reason that there are
equally strong grounds for enforcing the new promise in the two cases. The
creditor has not been paid; and he has been deprived of his remedy by corn.-
pulsion of law ....
1A Co si,, supra note 13, § 222 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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it is of such a nature as not to discredit his ability or character
too seriously, but not if his prospective earnings are to be
consumed in trying to meet old debts. If an employee's wages
are not exempt from garnishment, he may not feel that he can
afford to work anywhere his creditors can reach him. There is
no public policy in favor of permitting creditors to bring such
pressure upon a man that he feels moved to migrate or to pro-
ceed under an assumed name . . . . A debtor doomed to spend
the rest of his life working for his old creditors is discouraged
from trying to accumulate any property, and the motive which
leads many a man to productive effort may thus be destroyed.
Furthermore, there is no need to deprecate sympathy for the
honest debtor who may merely have made a mistake in judg-
ment, or who may have been overwhelmed by a slander, a strike,
an automobile accident, a general depression or some other cause
beyond his control. Thus, the prospect of a discharge serves
legitimate social and economic ends as well as serving to induce
compliance with the Bankruptcy Act as a branch of collection
law.
7 6
The motive to engage in productive effort will not be found in a
bankrupt if the discharge does not facilitate a substantial disengagement
from past obligations. Furthermore, any restoration of such motive may
be only temporary if bankruptcy was caused by poor planning. 7 The
reaffirmation doctrine tends to tie the debtor to past mistakes, and the
operation of the doctrine aggravates the problem of the bankrupt who
does not have habits of consumption which match his means. In both
respects, there is impermissible conflict with bankruptcy objectives.
In both Local Loan Co.7 ' and Pere79 the Supreme Court struck
down state laws which established post-bankruptcy consequences for
pre-bankruptcy conduct. This is exactly what application of the moral
obligation theory does when applied to bankruptcy situations. There is
no significant post-bankruptcy conduct that can justify enforcement of
76. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 7, at 88; see also 1A COLLIER, supra note 8, ff
14.02[1] ; 7 IEmiNGTON, supra note 7, § 2993.
77. Many bankruptcies are caused by financial reverses that could not be reason-
ably anticipated. Medical expenses, marital difficulties and personal injury litigation
fall in this category. However, a substantial portion of bankruptcies are attributable
in whole or in part to poor money management. H. MATHEWS, CAUSES OF PERSONAL
BANKRUPTCIEs 73-80 (1969); Comment, Discharge Provisions it; Consumer Bank-
ruptcy: The Need for a New Approach, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1250, 1264 (1970). The
reaffirmation rule exploits the poor planning ability of this group.
78. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
79. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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the promise. Moral obligation is not consideration unless one adopts a
definition that equates consideration with enforceability."0 Such a defini-
tion allows states to change rules of property or contract whenever there
is disagreement with bankruptcy policy. The Bankruptcy Act establishes
a procedural system for the termination of insolvents' affairs resting upon
a foundation of state law. Implicit in the interstitial character of this
statute is the requirement that state law not discriminate against the
effective operation of any provision of the federal act.81 The Act does not
require that the states adopt a particular methodology for drawing the
line between enforceable and unenforceable promises. But the system
chosen should be consistently applied to the promise of a bankrupt. Since
the moral obligation theory is not a generally applied theory of enforce-
ability, 2 it may not be used discretely to create post-bankruptcy con-
sequences for pre-bankruptcy conduct.
The use of a special rule of contract for bankrupts undercuts the
value of the discharge. A discharge does not change a man; it only
gives him the chance to avoid the repetition of past mistakes. If his
instinct for self-preservation is strong, he will use his discharge to ward
off old creditors and will be cautious about acquiring new ones. Even if
he makes a hasty promise, commonly applied principles of contract law
will permit him to escape from many engagements: there will be no
obligation unless the bankrupt has received consideration for his promise.
There is, however, no leeway for change of mind when the moral obliga-
80. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS does not use the term in that
sense. See § 75, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
81. A brief discussion on the relationship between state and federal law in
bankruptcy proceedings will be found in 2 G. GILmol, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 45.2 (1965). Professor Gilmore is interested in the distributive
function of bankruptcy, but his remarks are also appropriate to the discharge feature.
A very limited footnote discussion in Collier suggests that because Congress has not
acted, the nature of the bankrupt's obligation following reaffirmation is to be determined
by state law.
The Bankruptcy Act does not attempt to deal with the effect of a new
promise or the revival of the discharged debt. Accordingly, one must look
to state law, just as one must look there to see whether a contract is made, a
note issued, a judgment entered, or the like.
1A COLLIER, supra note 8, 1 17.33 n.3.
82. Only three cases have been found in which the moral obligation inherent in
a bankrupt's obligation was found to have any significance outside bankruptcy. Livesay
v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 S.W2d 86 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933) (creditor with claim
discharged in bankruptcy has insurable interest in life of debtor even though debtor
did not reaffirm obligation); Arkansas Baptist State Conv'n v. Board of Trustees of
Baptist State Hosp., 209 Ark. 236, 189 S.W.2d 913 (1945) (payment by hospital
trustees on account of discharged obligation is not breach of fiduciary duty); Green-
spon v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 431 (1947) (payment of obligation of bankrupt corporation
by its shareholders deductible as a bad debt). None of these cases holds that a
promissory obligation is valid. Instead the moral obligation theory is cited to support
related, yet distinct, rights.
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tion theory is invoked. Bankruptcy is not a pleasant experience, and it is
understandable that debtors wish to rid themselves of shame by reassur-
ing old creditors. The reaffirmation rule, however, converts reassurance
into obligation and permits creditors to exploit the temporary lack of
caution which may follow the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.
Insofar as legal sanctions exist for the enforcement of such promises, the
bankrupt's chances for permanent financial rehabilitation are jeopardized.
For a long time it has been recognized that infants, intoxicated
persons and those who are mentally ill may not, in certain situations,
have the capacity to contract."3 Arguably, a bankrupt's capacity to incur
obligation should be limited in some fashion for a period following the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings.84 The adjudication of bankruptcy
bears some similarity to a declaration of incompetency, since in many
cases it is the recognition that a debtor has not been able to protect
himself against the imposition of others. The states, however, have
relaxed the requirement of consideration for this one type of promise.
Instead of no capacity, or limited capacity, the bankrupt has extra
capacity. The slick verbalizations traditionally offered to rationalize
results produced by this doctrine 5 cannot conceal the fact that it is
easier for the recent bankrupt to create contractual responsibility than it
is for most other types of promisors.
Some states have recognized the potential for injury to a debtor
implicit in the reaffirmation doctrine and by legislative act or judicial
decision have attempted to provide compensating protection for him. A
few jurisdictions, beginning with Massachusetts in 1856, have adopted
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 18 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
84. See note 100 infra.
85. . . . The note was a debt provable in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
legal obligation which it created or evidenced was, by virtue of the con-
firmation of the composition offer and the discharge in the proceedings,
discharged by force of the statute, and the remedy of plaintiff existing at
the time the discharge was granied to recover her debt by action barred.
The right of action is given by a new and efficacious promise. The practice
of bringing the action upon the original demand is, however, sanctioned
by usage. The discharge in bankruptcy is, under such practice, regarded4 as a
discharge of the debt sub inodo only, and the new promise as a waiver of the
bar to the recovery of the debt created by the discharge. The new promise
with such other facts as are essential to constitute it a valid cause of action
may, however, be alleged. [citations]
The rule of law is well-nigh universal that such a promise made has
an obligating and validating consideration in the moral obligation of the
debtor to pay. The debt is not paid by the discharge in bankruptcy. It is due
in conscience, although discharged in law, and this moral obligation, uniting
with the subsequent promise to pay, creates a right of action . ...
Herrington v. Davitt, 220 N.Y. 162, 165-67, 115 N.E. 476, 476-77 (1917).
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a statutory requirement that the reaffirmation be in writing."8 In these
jurisdictions it may be argued that there is no conflict with the Bank-
ruptcy Act since the statutory formality of a'writing is functionally
equivalent to the natural formality of a bargain. This argument is not
persuasive. If a writing could provide much the same protection as a
bargain, one would expect that a writing would be sufficient to create
promissory liability in a large variety of situations. However, the writing
requirement is not a generalized alternative to the requirement of a
bargain, and its use to create post-bankruptcy consequences for pre-
bankruptcy conduct must still be suspect.
Special treatment for the bankrupt can also be found in some
judicial decisions. A promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of
limitations may be inferred from part payment of the barred obligation.
No such implication is found in a bankrupt's partial payment of his old
debt. 7 Several courts have applied a standard of proof to the bankrupt's
promise which is substantially more demanding than the one applied
when the promise is to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations.88
However, in the great majority of states which have no requirement of a
writing, special evidentiary standards should not save the rule. Judging
from reported litigation, the main problem with reaffirmations is that
they are ill-considered. High standards of proof give no substantial
protection to the debtor who clearly makes a promise and later changes
his mind. Thus, only in those states where the reaffirmation must be in
writing is there any basis for arguing that the moral obligation theory
does not conflict with the discharge feature of the federal statute. Even
then, the enforceability of the reaffirmation is most suspect.
Let us recapitulate these arguments. The bargain concept of con-
sideration plays an important role in setting the limits of enforceable
obligations. Bargain is a generalized theory of enforceability, while
moral obligation theory has a very limited area of application. The Bank-
86. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(10) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 38-102 (1962);
GA. CoDE ANN. § 3-902 (1962) ; M . REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 51.6 (1964) ; MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 259, § 3 (1968); MiN . STAT. ANN. § 513.01(4) (1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 25:1-7 (1940); N.Y. GEN. OBLiGATIONS LAW § 5-701.5 (McKinney 1964);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-4 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-512 (1957). Discussions of this
type of statute are found in Holt v. Akarman, 84 N.J.L. 371, 86 Atl. 408 (Ct. Err,
& App. 1913), Nathan v. Leland, 193 Mass. 576, 79 N.E. 793 (1907).
87. Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957); Alper v. Republic Inv,
Co., 82 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Polk v. Stephens, 118 Ark. 438, 176 S.W. 689,
(1915) ; Lupinski v. Fischer, 255 Wis. 182, 38 N.W.2d 429 (1949).
88. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Neblett, 19 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'da
26 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930); Mandell v. Levy, 47 Misc. 147, 93 N.Y.S.
545 (Sup. Ct. 1905). But cf. Warren v. Schawe, 163 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
The variance in standards of proof is criticized in IA CoRBiN, supra note 13, § 222.
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ruptcy Act, like any interstitial statute, cannot function effectively if
there is one set of state rules applicable when the statute is not in issue
(normal contract situations) and another set when the protections of the
statute are invoked (moral obligation situations). When one under-
stands how closely the effectiveness of a debtor's discharge is dependent
upon the degree of caution exhibited by the bankrupt in his post-discharge
actions, the harm caused by a state rule which permits bankrupts to
commit future earnings becomes apparent. The bargain theory of enforce-
ability is related to predictable patterns of human behavior, as is the dis-
charge provision of the Bankruptcy Act. Hence, the moral obligation
theory conflicts with the Act because it creates promissory liability in
situations where normal contracting conduct does not exist.
THE REAFFIRMATION THEORY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
The primary focus thus far has been on the conflict between state
law and bankruptcy policy. This is not to suggest, however, that concern
at the state level about the consequences of Lord Mansfield's view is
inappropriate. His views encourage debt collection practices which,
although conventionally acceptable, may be undesirable or burdensome to
specific categories of debtors. Many attorneys with bankruptcy practice
are concerned with the constant pressure for reaffirmation experienced
by their clients. The little empirical evidence available suggests that the
practice is a common one and that finance companies are foremost among
creditors seeking reaffirmations. s9 One can also suspect that the bank-
rupt credit consumer most likely to make an inconsiderate reaffirmation
is also the least equipped by education and circumstance in life to make
a wise consumer choice. The reaffirmation rule in contemporary society
may thus be revealed as just another aspect of victimization of the poor.
In any event, state officials ought to be concerned with what type of
creditor is seeking the reaffirmation and what kind of debtor is making
the reaffirmation. After all, states have traditionally been concerned with
harmonizing debtor and creditor interests. Excessively exuberant collec-
tion efforts lead to civil liability."0 Statutes authorizing creditors' remedies
are filled with limitations and restrictions. Even though the control of the
collection process is unsystematic, the totality of ad hoc judgments made
by legislators and judges does represent society's view of a debtor's
89. JAcOB, supra note 3, at 110. Hearings on HR. 6665 and HR. 1225o Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7, at
89 (1969) (statement of Professor Paul Garrity).
90. Discussions of wrongful collection activity are found in Hurt, Debt Collection
Torts, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Comment, Collection Capers: Liability for Debt
Collection Practices, 24 U. Cira. L. lav. 572 (1957).
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moral obligation to repay the credit advanced to him. Deference to a
doctrine, now almost two hundred year old, obscures the point that the
reaffirmation rule is part of the collection process. The relevant question,
therefore, is whether it is an appropriate rule for contemporary
society. Although it has been argued that the federal interest is so strong
and the conflict so direct that the challenge of pre-emption should succeed,
there is no impediment to state action designed to increase the value of
the discharge. If the reaffirmation rule is not changed at the state level,
however, it will eventually be changed by federal action."
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE AND RECENT
BANKRUPTCY ACT AMENDMENTS
Recent amendments to the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act may make the reaffirmation doctrine even more of a problem than in
the past. Until recently a sharp distinction was drawn between the bank-
rupt's eligibility for discharge and the effect of his discharge. Although
eligibility was determined by the bankruptcy court, the effect was deter-
mined by any court chosen by the creditor to enforce a discharged
obligation. Certain policy considerations supported a division of re-
sponsibility between these two forums, 2 but there are serious short-
comings in an arrangement which remits the decision as to the effect of a
discharge to a forum other than the original bankruptcy court. Foremost
among these shortcomings was the temptation for a creditor to sue on
an obligation, although it was unquestionably discharged, in the hope
that the bankrupt would not appear to plead his affirmative defense.9"
Such post-petition litigation was often successful in cases where the
bankrupt would have had a complete defense if he had only contested the
creditor's claim.
Late in 1970 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in an attempt
to deal with this problem.9 The bankruptcy court was given exclusive re-
sponsibility for determining whether certain of the bankrupt's obligations
were discharged. It was further provided that these debts were to be
91. Wage garnishments were subjected to federal control when the states did not
respond to problems caused by excessive collection efforts. Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). This statute and the recent decision in Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), may herald the beginning of intensive
federal regulation of collection practices.
92. See Dilenschnieder, Dischargeability: A Brief for the Consumer Bankrupt, 44
REF. J. 83, 88-89 (1970).
93. This and another deficiencies in the statutory scheme are described in
Countryman, Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Proposals, 19 U. KAN.
L. REv. 165, 169-70 (1971).
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a), 12, 32(b), 32(f)-(h), 33, 35(a)(2), 35(a)(5)-(8),
35(b)-(c), 66(4), 94(b) (1970).
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deemed discharged unless the creditor secured a ruling that they were non-
dischargeable. It is expected that the shift of forum and the new require-
ment that the creditor take affirmative steps in the bankruptcy court to
secure a ruling on dischargeability will substantially increase the pro-
tective value of a discharge. A provision added to § 14 of the Bankruptcy
Act directs that the discharge when granted shall "enjoin all creditors
whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any
action or employing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities
of the bankrupt."95 Thus, a creditor who ignores the discharge and con-
tinues in the discredited practice of post-bankruptcy litigation runs the
risk of a contempt citation.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the recent statutory change which
prevents a persistent creditor from securing a reaffirmation and bringing
suit on the subsequent promise. In fact there is a danger that much of
the beneficial effect of this recent legislation will be nullified if courts
continue to follow Lord Mansfield's theory of moral obligation. Before
enactment of the amendments, a creditor who wished to get around the
bar of the discharge could either secure a reaffirmation or disregard the
discharge and sue, hoping the debtor would not appear in court. The
latter alternative is now too perilous, but the former practice is still
permissible. Because reaffirmation is now the only alternative, the
pressure exerted on bankrupts to reaffirm can be expected to increase.
As creditors seek to avoid the impact of the 1970 amendments, the
attractions of the moral obligation theory will become apparent to them.
The benefits to bankrupts of the 1970 legislation would have been
substantially increased if it had been provided that those types of debts
which are deemed discharged, unless specifically determined to be non-
dischargeable by the federal court, could not, under any circumstances,
be reaffirmed. Instead, the explanatory memorandum of the National
Bankruptcy Conference accompanying the Senate Bill notes that legis-
lative action does not touch the reaffirmation rule:
This proposed legislation also does not affect in any way a
bankrupt's obligation upon a discharged debt which is subse-
quently revived by a new promise. In the absence of any
statutory directive, the case law has permitted enforcement
of such new promise made after the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding."
95. 11 U.S.C. § 14(f) (2).
96. S. REP. No. 91-1173, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970), citing CoLaLM, supra,
note 8, 1111 7.33-.38.
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Thus, the recent legislation certainly cannot be interpreted as a mandate
to overturn the reaffirmation rule. However, it should be remembered
that the pre-emption argument outlined earlier does not in any way rely
on the policy articulated in the 1970 amendments. That argument refers
instead to the interstitial character of bankruptcy legislation and the
implied obligation imposed on the states to construct a law of contract
that does not discriminate against federal interests. It is difficult to find
anything in the congressional action or in the report on the Senate Bill
which is adverse to this analysis of the conflict between state and federal
law. The purpose of the statutory change was to make the dis-
charge more meaningful for the bankrupt. If congressional silence is
viewed as acceptance of Lord Mansfield's doctrine, then this unusual
situation occurs: a bill to increase the protective quality of the discharge
legitimizes creditor activity which will eventually erode the protective
devices established by the same bill. This would, indeed, be an extra-
ordinary construction of congressional inaction. Therefore, the silence of
Congress should be interpreted as irrelevant to the resolution of the con-
troversy."
CONCLUSION
On July 9, 1923 a debtor executed a promissory note containing a
clause which was interpreted as a waiver of the right to plead the defense
of a discharge in bankruptcy. Within five days an involuntary petition
was filed against the maker of the note and, when the creditor sought to
enforce the note, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to
decide whether this waiver wag binding. It had no difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the reaffirmation precedents, including Zavelo:
* * * These decisions do not reach to the facts of the case
at bar. One purpose of the bankruptcy act is to enable debtors
to secure a release from the legally enforceable obligation of
every debt provable against their estates and not of the excepted
classes. Its design is both to secure a ratable distribution of the
property of the bankrupt among his creditors and to enable
an honest and deserving debtor to get a fresh start in life.
Plainly the note here in suit was provable in bankruptcy against
the estate of the defendants. It would be repugnant to the
purpose of the bankruptcy act to permit the circumvention of
97. It appears that the failure to deal with the reaffirmation doctrine was motivated
by a desire to avoid controversy. See Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45
Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 23 (1971).
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its object by the simple device of a clause in the agreement, out
of which the provable debt springs, stipulating that a discharge
in bankruptcy will not be pleaded by the debtor. The bankruptcy
act would in the natural course of business be nullified in the
vast majority of debts arising out of contracts, if this were
permissible. It would be vain to enact a bankruptcy law with
all its elaborate machinery for settlement of the estates of bank-
rupt debtors, which could so easily be rendered of no effect. The
bar of the discharge under the terms of the bankruptcy act is
not restricted to those instances where the debtor has not waived
his right to plead it. It is universal and unqualified in terms.
It affects all debts within the scope of its words. It would be
contrary to the letter of § 17 of the bankruptcy act as we
interpret it to uphold the waiver embodied in this note. So to
do would be incompatible with the spirit of that section. Its aim
would largely be defeated."
Exactly the same criticisms can be made of the reaffirmation
doctrine. There is no significant difference between a promise not to
plead the discharge made a moment before the petition is filed and a
reaffirmation uttered immediately after the petition.99 Both are likely to
be reckless engagements which, if often obtained and routinely enforced,
would provide creditors with an easy method for evading the discharge
feature of the Bankruptcy Act. A state court could refuse to enforce
gratuitous reaffirmations on the theory that they are incompatible with
§ 17 of the Act. Furthermore, Local Loan Co. established that bank-
ruptcy courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction and restrain enforce-
ment of state laws in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. This ancillary jur-
isdiction could be invoked to prevent enforcement of reaffirmations.'
Regardless of the procedure employed, it is time to use the judicial
process to challenge this ancient contract doctrine.
It has been almost two hundred years since Lord Mansfield
announced the reaffirmation rule. Not once since then has an American
98. Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 159, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (1925) ;
accord, In re Weitzen, 3 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). But cf. Rietbrock v. Studds, 262
Wis. 5, 53 N.W.2d 712 (1952), in which the court held that a waiver clause did not
make a note unenforceable. The court cited Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913),
and Meyer v. Price, 250 N.Y. 370, 165 N.E. 814 (1929), as authority for waiver
clauses without noticing that in both cases the promise was made after bankruptcy.
99. Nevertheless, the distinction is accepted without question. 1A COLLIER, sipra
note 8, J 17.36; MAcLACHLAN, supra note 7, at 98; 7 REMINGTON, supra note 7, § 2997.
100. In re Patt, 43 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1941). See also In re Harris, 28 F.
Supp. 487 (E.D. Ili. 1939) (ancillary jurisdiction not properly invoked).
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court challenged the doctrine; nevertheless, it clearly seems to offend
bankruptcy policy. A discharge does not change a man; it only gives him
the chance to avoid some consequences of past mistakes if he is resolute.
If his instinct for self-preservation is strong, he will use his discharge to
ward off old creditors and this, coupled with care to avoid the acquisition
of many new obligations, will enable him to regain his financial footing.
The discharge alone is not enough. There must also be prudence. The
reaffirmation rule permits creditors to exploit the temporary lack of
caution which any bankrupt can be expected to feel. It is certainly under-
standable that debtors may wish to rid themselves of shame by reassuring
old creditors that everything will be put right, but reckless assumption
of responsibility must be prevented. Except for the moral obligation
theory, traditional contract doctrine would protect the debtor in the case
of a gratuitous reaffirmation. States have it within their power to deter-
mine that gratuitous reaffirmations will never be -binding, or at least to
require that such reaffirmations be written. Absent such action it would
be appropriate for a state or federal court to hold that oral reaffirmations
are no longer enforceable, under a pre-emption theory based on Perez
and Local Loan Co. Indeed, these decisions invite such a challenge to
state law. If the reaffirmation rule remains in vogue, it may eventually be
necessary for Congress to enact legislation restricting its operation.
It would be foolhardy to predict the early demise of Lord Mansfield's
viewpoint. It has been uncritically accepted for so many years that
change will be difficult to achieve. But there is so little justification for
this one-sided transaction that a de novo consideration of the rule is in
order.'
101. Reaffirmations arising out of transactions in which new consideration is
received by the debtor present different problems. The debtor may make a reaffirmation
which he later regrets, but this is no different from the assumption of any promissory
responsibility which he later wishes to evade. If it appears that non-gratuitous
reaffirmations are going to be troublesome, one solution might be to require approval
by the bankruptcy court of the reaffirmation as a condition to its validity. If this
limitation on the power of the bankrupt to contract existed only for the first few
months after the filing of the petition, it would not be necessary to hold the estate
open for an unreasonable amount of time. This approach would protect the bankrupt
without denying him access to likely sources of capital.
